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Presentations of Gricean semantics, including Stephen Neale’s in “Silent 
Reference,” totally ignore vagueness, even though virtually every utter-
ance is vague. I ask how Gricean semantics might be adjusted to accom-
modate vague speaker-meaning. My answer is that it can’t accommodate 
it: the Gricean program collapses in the face of vague speaker-meaning. 
The Gricean might, however, fi nd some solace in knowing that every 
other extant meta-semantic and semantic program is in the same boat.
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Gricean semantics is a program for reducing all questions about the 
intentionality of speech acts and linguistic expressions to questions 
about the intentionality of thought. It takes as its cornerstone a certain 
notion of speaker-meaning and seeks to defi ne it, without recourse to 
any semantic notions, in terms of acting with certain audience-directed 
intentions. Then it seeks to defi ne other agent-semantic notions—most 
notably speaker-reference and illocutionary act—in terms of its defi ned 
notion of speaker-meaning, and after that to defi ne the semantic fea-
tures of linguistic expressions—meaning, reference, truth conditions, 
etc.—wholly in terms of the already defi ned agent-semantic notions, to-
gether with certain ancillary notions, such as that of convention, which 
are themselves explicable wholly in terms of non-semantic proposi-
tional attitudes. Gricean semantics is the program that Stephen Neale 
sympathetically explains with marvelous clarity and comprehensive-
ness in “Silent Reference.”
Neale is a self-proclaimed Gricean. At the same time, he is aware that 
the Gricean program is not without problems. One of those problems is 
the possibility of “aphonics,” indexicals that appear in a sentence’s LF 
representation but are “silent” in that they aren’t phonetically realized. 
For if there are aphonics, then they will evidently have referents rela-
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tive to utterances of sentences in whose LF representations they occur, 
but it’s diffi cult to see how those referents can be determined by speak-
ers’ referential intentions, which is what a Gricean account of expres-
sion-reference would seem to require. Neale would like to remove the 
threat posed by aphonics by showing that they can be accommodated 
within a Gricean theory of reference, and he suggests one way that ac-
commodation might be achieved. But, as I tried to show (Schiffer 2017) 
in my response to “Silent Reference,” there is a question as to whether 
that attempt succeeds, and I suggested another route by which accom-
modation might be achieved. This essay, however, isn’t about aphonics. 
It’s about a problem for which I believe no Gricean solution is possible.
A striking feature of presentations of Gricean theories of meaning—
as well as of virtually every other presentation of a foundational theory 
of meaning—is that they completely ignore vagueness, even though 
virtually every utterance is vague. Perhaps the authors of these pre-
sentations would say that their ignoring vagueness is a useful idealiza-
tion akin to Galileo’s ignoring friction in his idealized model of bodies in 
motion. They might say that. But they would be wrong: vagueness can’t 
be accommodated within the Gricean program. There is more than one 
way to show this, but I will begin by showing that no Gricean account of 
speaker-meaning can accommodate vague speaker-meaning, and that 
will be enough to enable us to see how vagueness also frustrates the as-
pirations of Gricean accounts of expression-meaning. We will also have 
an indication of how the problem that vagueness makes for Gricean 
semantics is one it also makes for competing semantic programs.
1. Gricean Speaker-Meaning and Speaker-Reference
Assertoric speaker-meaning—henceforth simply speaker-meaning—is 
the notion of a speaker’s meaning that such-and-such, as when, for ex-
ample, in uttering ‘He’s ready’ Jill meant that Jack was ready to go to 
dinner. It’s the most general kind of assertoric illocutionary act, the ge-
nus of which all other kinds of assertoric illocutionary acts—saying that 
such-and-such, asserting that such-and-such, denying that such-and-
such, objecting that such-and-such, telling so-and-so that such-and-
such, etc.—are species. The Gricean, like most current philosophers of 
language, takes speaker-meaning to be a relation, S meant p, between 
a person S and a proposition p that she meant, where a proposition is 
an abstract entity that has truth conditions, has those truth conditions 
necessarily, and is mind- and language-independent in that it belongs 
to no language and wasn’t created by what anyone said or thought.1 
1 For my purposes it doesn’t matter to which kind of proposition—Fregean, 
Russellian, functions from possible worlds into truth-values, whatever—the Gricean 
thinks the propositions we mean belong, but for simplicity of exposition I will 
often write as though the Gricean takes the propositions we mean to be Russellian 
propositions, i.e. structured entities whose basic components are the objects and 
properties our speech acts are about.
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What distinguishes the Gricean from other theorists who take speaker-
meaning to be a relation to propositions is the Gricean’s conception of 
the nature of that relation: for the Gricean the speaker-meaning rela-
tion is defi nable wholly in terms of a speaker’s intentions. Neale gives 
the fl avor of a Gricean account of speaker-meaning with the following 
slightly altered capsule restatement of the account of speaker-meaning 
I proposed in (1972) and then later used to devise the concomitant ac-
counts of speaker- and expression-reference Neale discusses in “Silent 
Reference”:
In uttering x, S meant p ≈ for some audience A and feature φ, S ut-
tered x intending S and A to mutually know that x has φ and, on 
the basis of this, that S uttered x intending A actively to believe p.
Here ‘utter’ is used, following Grice (1957), in an artifi cially extended 
way to include any action by which a person might mean something—
spoken utterances, of course, orthographic inscriptions, hand signals, 
as well as nonconventional acts by which a person might mean some-
thing, as when, for example, a person mimes being asleep to commu-
nicate that she is bored. In (what is supposed to be) the normal case in 
which a person means a proposition, she does so by uttering a sentence 
with whose meaning the proposition she means comports (as, for ex-
ample, the proposition that it’s raining in Dubrovnik comports with the 
meaning of the sentence ‘It’s raining’) but for the Gricean it’s essential 
that his account of speaker-meaning not in any sense require x to have 
antecedent meaning, for a defi ning feature of his theory of meaning is 
that expression-meaning is to be reductively defi ned in terms of his 
defi nition of speaker-meaning. ‘Mutual knowledge’ holds a place for 
whatever is the correct way of spelling out the requirement that S’s 
meaning-constituting intentions be “out in the open” between her and 
her audience; David Lewis’s notion of common knowledge (1969: 1975) 
and my similar notion of mutual knowledge* (1972) were independent 
attempts to do that spelling out, but for present purposes no specifi c 
account of mutual knowledge needs to be presupposed. An activated 
belief is a belief that one has consciously in mind. The most common 
way for S to intend A actively to believe p is for her to intend her utter-
ance to cause A to believe p, as when the purpose of S’s utterance is to 
provide A with knowledge of p; but S’s intention in uttering x may be 
merely to remind A of p, and that, too, counts as S’s intending A actively 
to believe p.
Corresponding to the distinction between speaker-meaning and 
expression-meaning is a distinction, central to the main issue joined 
in “Silent Reference,” between speaker-reference and expression-ref-
erence. But this second distinction folds into the fi rst, since, as Neale 
makes clear, the primary notion of speaker-reference is simply a spe-
cies of speaker-meaning. Actually, there are three notions of speak-
er-reference to be accommodated, which I will call primary speaker-
reference, higher-order speaker-reference, and referring-with. Primary 
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speaker-reference—signifi ed by the subscript ’π’ in ’S referredπ to o in 
uttering x’—is for the Gricean the most basic notion of speaker-ref-
erence in terms of which the other two notions are to be defi ned. It’s 
defi ned thus:
S referredπ to o in uttering x iff for some o-dependent proposition po, 
S meant po in uttering x.
An o-dependent proposition is a proposition that is individuated partly 
in terms of o, so that o occurs essentially in the proposition’s truth con-
ditions, and thus wouldn’t exist if o didn’t exist. For example:
In uttering ‘I’m sleepy’ Sid meant the Sid-dependent proposition 
that he was sleepy, and therefore referredπ to himself in uttering 
that sentence.
In uttering ‘She divorced him’, Jane meant the Angelina- and Brad- 
dependent proposition that Angelina divorced Brad, and therefore 
referredπ both to Angelina and to Brad in uttering that sentence.
Higher-order speaker reference is exemplifi ed by Sally’s reference to 
Henry when she uttered ‘That woman talking to Henry is French’, 
where Odile is the woman to whom Sally referred and the proposition 
she meant was that she, Odile, was French. Here Odile was the only 
thing to which Sally referredπ in producing her utterance. Yet even 
though Sally didn’t referπ to Henry in uttering ‘That woman talking 
to Henry is French’, she nevertheless referred to him in uttering that 
sentence: she referred to Henry by virtue of her referringπ to Odile 
qua woman standing next to Henry. In other words, Sally didn’t refer 
to Henry in order to mean something about him, but rather in order 
to identify the woman about whom she meant something. The refer-
ence to Henry is an instance of second-order speaker-reference: Sally 
referred to Henry in order to referπ to Odile. Now consider Jack’s ut-
terance of ‘The boy with the dog who’s growling at Hilda is lost’, where 
Billy is the boy to whom Jack referredπ and the proposition he meant 
was that he, Billy, was lost. Then Jack made a primary reference (i.e. a 
referenceπ) to the boy with the dog who’s growling at Hilda, a secondary 
reference to the dog who’s growling at Hilda, and, by virtue of referring 
to the dog qua dog growling at Hilda, a tertiary reference to Hilda. In 
(1981) I offered a recursive defi nition of speaker-reference devised by 
Brian Loar and myself which accommodated all cases of speaker-refer-
ence, but I will now henceforth ignore higher-order speaker-reference, 
drop the subscript ‘π’, and proceed as though speaker-reference were 
speaker-referenceπ.
This brings us to the important distinction between referring-in and 
referring-with.2 Consider these two acts of speaker-meaning.
In singin g “Let the Good Times Roll,” Gretel meant that Hansel, her 
husband, was out of town.
2 In (1981) and elsewhere I spoke e.g. of Jane’s referring to John by (her utterance 
of) ‘he’. I thank Neale for suggesting the improvement of replacing ‘by’ with ‘with’.
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In uttering ‘He’s out of town’, Gretel meant that Hansel, her hus-
band, was out town.
In both examples Gretel refers to Hansel in producing her utterance. 
In the fi rst example she refers to him in singing ‘Let the good times 
roll!’, and in the second she refers to him in uttering ‘He’s out of town’. 
There is, however, the following important difference between the two 
utterances. In the fi rst there is no part of Gretel’s utterance with which 
she refers to Hansel, but there is in her second utterance: in that ut-
terance she refers to him with her uttered token of ‘he’. The following 
is a slightly revised version of the fi rst approximation to defi ning this 
notion to which Neale appeals in “Silent Reference”:
In uttering x S referred to o with S’s ith token of e in x, e𝜏ix, iff for 
some audience A and feature φ, in uttering x S intended S and A to 
mutually know that e𝜏ix has φ and, at least partly on the basis of 
this, that S referred to o in uttering x.
In other words, S referred to o with the token δ𝜏 of the singular term δ 
contained in her uttered token of the sentence 𝜎 when, roughly speak-
ing, S intended δ𝜏 to have a certain feature φ and for the fact that δ𝜏 had 
φ to do most of the work in making it mutual knowledge between S and 
her audience that she referred to o in uttering 𝜎. Of course, in (what is 
supposed to be) the normal case the inference-base feature φ will have 
as its most essential ingredient the fact that δ has the meaning it has in 
the shared language of S and her audience. For the Gricean the raison 
d’être of spoken languages is as instruments of interpersonal communi-
cation. If I want to tell my child that whales are mammals I can hardly 
do better than to utter ‘Whales are mammals’, and that, according to 
the Gricean, is because of the way the meaning of that sentence makes 
the fact that I uttered the sentence such extremely good evidence of 
my communicative intentions. That it is such good evidence is due to 
the meaning-determining conventional practices that prevail among 
speakers of the language to which the uttered expressions belong. I’ll 
have a little more to say about this later.
Turning to expression-reference, the Gricean will fi nd it useful to 
distinguish between a thing’s being the referent and its being the se-
mantic referent of a token of a singular term, where being the semantic 
referent entails being the referent, but not vice versa. The Gricean can 
defi ne the fi rst notion thus:
x is the referent of a token δ𝜏 of a singular term δ iff the person who 
produced δ𝜏 referred to x with it.
For example, if a wedding guest points to a man in a tuxedo and says 
‘I asked that waiter for more champagne’, then the indicated man is 
the referent of the uttered token of ‘that waiter’ whether or not he’s a 
waiter or merely the groom’s best man whom the wedding guest mis-
takes for a waiter. And he can defi ne the second notion thus:
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x is the semantic referent of a token δ𝜏 of a singular term δ iff (i) the 
person who uttered δ𝜏 referred to x with it and (ii) referring to x with 
δ𝜏 comports with the meaning of δ.
Thus, if the man to whom the wedding guest referred with his utter-
ance of ‘that waiter’ wasn’t a waiter, then, while the indicated man was 
the referent of the speaker’s uttered token of ‘that waiter’, he wasn’t 
the semantic referent of it, since, not being a waiter, the utterance of 
‘that waiter’ didn’t comport with the meaning of ‘that waiter’, since 
that meaning constrains one who utters the expression in conformity 
with the meaning-determining conventional practices of the language 
to be referring to a waiter. I’ll have a little more to say below on how 
the Gricean conceives expression-meanings, and of how those mean-
ings are supposed to constrain what speakers can mean in uttering 
sentences containing expressions with those meanings, but enough 
has been said for now for us to see how vague speaker-meaning makes 
trouble for the Gricean account of speaker-meaning and the semantic 
notions the Gricean aims to defi ne in terms of it.
2. Vague Speaker-Meaning
Here is an unexceptional example of vague speaker-meaning. Tom is 
reading in the park when a woman appears, calling ‘Billy, where are 
you? We have to leave now’. Intending to tell her something she might 
fi nd helpful, Tom says to the woman ‘A boy was here a little while ago’. 
We would certainly regard Tom as having told the woman something, 
and therefore as having meant and said something in producing his 
utterance. If the woman to whom he spoke didn’t catch his words and 
asked him what he said, Tom wouldn’t hesitate to say ‘I said that a 
boy was here a little while ago’, and we, knowing what we do, would 
accept Tom’s report of what he said as true. We would unhesitatingly 
take Tom’s utterance to be an act of speaker-meaning. Tom’s utterance 
was also vague. His utterance was vague because even if it was defi -
nitely true or defi nitely false, it might have been indefi nite whether or 
not it was true/false; that is to say, it might have been borderline true/
false. It’s three-ways overdetermined that Tom’s utterance was vague, 
for its contained utterances of ‘boy’, ‘here’, and ‘a little while ago’ were 
vague, and the vagueness of any one of those utterances suffi ced to 
make Tom’s utterance of ‘A boy was here a little while ago’ vague. And 
each of those utterances was vague because, even if the application to 
which Tom put it was defi nitely correct or defi nitely incorrect, it might 
have been neither. I intend Tom’s utterance to be an exemplar of vague 
speaker-meaning.
As already noted, the Gricean conception of speaker-meaning, as well 
as the dominant conception of it, is that of a relation between speakers 
and the propositions they mean. Let’s assume pro tem that this concep-
tion of speaker-meaning is correct and ask: What proposition did Tom 
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mean in uttering ‘A boy was here a little while ago’? Since propositions 
are mind- and language-independent entities, we can’t answer this ques-
tion without taking a stand on the issue of ontic vagueness, or vagueness 
in the world. That issue is a contest between a view I’ll call no-vague-
ness-in-the-world and one I’ll call vagueness-in-the-world. What exact-
ly is at issue in this contest is itself in need of precisifi cation, but to a 
good-enough approximation we may say that no-vagueness-in-the-world 
holds that nothing outside of language and thought can be vague in its 
own right (i.e. independently of the vagueness of language and thought), 
while vagueness-in-the-world holds that properties and things outside of 
language and thought may be vague in their own right. As a terminologi-
cal convenience I’ll say that things that aren’t vague in their own right 
are metaphysically precise, and that things that are vague in their own 
right are metaphysically vague. A proposition is metaphysically precise 
provided it’s necessarily the case that there is a fact of the matter as to 
what truth-value, if any, it has. If bivalence holds for propositions, then 
a proposition is metaphysically precise provided it’s necessarily the case 
that it’s a fact that it’s true or else a fact that it’s false. If, as Frege held, 
presupposition failure can render a proposition neither true nor false, 
then a proposition is metaphysically precise provided it’s necessarily the 
case that it’s a fact that it’s true, a fact that it’s false, or a fact that it’s 
neither true nor false. And if there are three or more truth-values, then 
a proposition is metaphysically precise provided it’s necessarily the case 
that there is a fact of the matter as to which truth-value it has. For sim-
plicity of exposition I will assume that metaphysically-precise proposi-
tions are bivalent, either true or else false. As a matter of terminology I’ll 
say that if a proposition is metaphysically-precise, then it can’t be meta-
physically indefi nite what it’s truth-value is, but that will be compatible 
with its being indefi nite what it’s truth-value is in an epistemic sense of 
‘indefi nite’, which is to say, the sense that it would have if the epistemic 
theory of vagueness were correct. A proposition is metaphysically-vague 
provided it can be metaphysically indefi nite what it’s truth-value is; in 
other words, if the proposition can be borderline true/false in its own 
right, independently of the vagueness of words and concepts. A property 
is metaphysically precise provided it’s necessarily the case that every-
thing is such that it either has the property or else doesn’t have it, and a 
thing that is neither a property nor a proposition—e.g. an apple, a dog, 
a geographical area, or a period of time—is precise provided it’s neces-
sarily the case that it has metaphysically-precise conditions of individu-
ation (so if it’s a geographical area it can’t be metaphysically indefi nite 
what its boundaries are, and if it’s a period of time it can’t be metaphysi-
cally indefi nite when it began or when it ended, or how many seconds or 
yoctoseconds3 have passed between the instant of time it began and the 
instant of time it ended). Anything that isn’t metaphysically precise is 
metaphysically vague.
3 One yoctosecond = one trillionth of a trillionth of a second.
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There is one possible answer to the question of what proposition 
Tom meant in uttering ‘A boy was here a little while ago’ with which we 
needn’t be concerned—namely, that for some metaphysically-precise 
proposition p, Tom defi nitely meant p in uttering ‘A boy was here a 
little while ago’. We needn’t be concerned with this possible answer 
because if it were true Tom’s utterance of ‘A boy was here a little while 
ago’ wouldn’t have been vague. There remain four possible answers 
that are compatible with the vagueness of Tom’s utterance. The fi rst 
two are on the side of no-vagueness-in-the-world, the second two on 
the side of vagueness-in-the-world. That needs to be qualifi ed. There 
are actually infi nitely many possible answers—but we need to be con-
cerned with only four of them. It’s so-called higher-order vagueness that 
is responsible for the profl igate proliferation. Consider Harold, whom 
we take to be a borderline case of a bald man, which is to say, nearly 
enough, that we take it to be indefi nite whether or not he’s bald. Now, 
the notion of a borderline case is itself vague; so there’s the apparent 
possibility that he is a borderline case of a borderline case of a bald 
man, or a borderline case of a borderline case of a borderline case of 
a bald man, or …. The relevance of this to my argument may be illus-
trated in the following way. One of the possible answers I consider to 
the question “What proposition did Tom mean in uttering ‘A boy was 
here a little while ago’?” is the following:
There is no metaphysically-vague proposition that Tom defi nitely 
meant in uttering ‘A boy was here a little while ago’, but there are 
myriad metaphysically-vague propositions each such that it’s indef-
inite whether or not Tom meant it in uttering that sentence.
If we now take higher-order vagueness into account, then other pos-
sible answers are: 
There is no metaphysically-vague proposition that Tom defi nitely 
meant in uttering ‘A boy was here a little while ago’, but there are 
myriad metaphysically-vague propositions each such that it’s in-
defi nite whether or not it’s indefi nite whether or not Tom meant it 
in uttering ‘A boy was here a little while ago’.
There is no metaphysically-vague proposition that Tom defi nitely 
meant in uttering ‘A boy was here a little while ago’, but there are 
myriad metaphysically-vague propositions each such that it’s in-
defi nite whether or not it’s indefi nite whether or not it’s indefi nite 
whether or not Tom meant it in uttering ‘A boy was here a little 
while ago’.
And so on without end.
That infi nite sequence isn’t the only way indefi niteness can proliferate. 
Another apparent type of possibility would be the series:
There is a proposition p that Tom defi nitely meant in uttering ‘A 
boy was here a little while ago’ but it’s indefi nite whether or not p is 
metaphysically precise.
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There is a proposition p that Tom defi nitely meant in uttering ‘A 
boy was here a little while ago’ but it’s indefi nite whether or not it’s 
indefi nite whether or not p is metaphysically precise.
There is a proposition p that Tom defi nitely meant in uttering ‘A 
boy was here a little while ago’ but it’s indefi nite whether or not it’s 
indefi nite whether or not whether or not it’s indefi nite whether or 
not p is metaphysically precise.
And so on without end.
And one can easily see that other kinds of i nfi nite proliferations are 
possible. I propose, however, to ignore higher-order vagueness alto-
gether and pretend that it’s only fi rst-order vagueness with which we 
have to contend, and I will assume it’s always metaphysically defi nite 
whether a proposition (or anything else) is metaphysically precise or 
metaphysically vague; for I trust it will be clear how the objections I 
will raise to the four possible answers I do consider also apply to the 
infi nitely many possible answers I don’t consider.
The four possible answers to be considered are as follows.
(A) For some metaphysically-precise proposition p, Tom meant p 
in uttering ‘A boy was here a little while ago’, but it’s indefi nite 
whether or not he meant p in uttering that sentence.
(B) There is no metaphysically-precise proposition that Tom defi -
nitely meant in uttering ‘A boy was here a little while ago’, 
but there are myriad metaphysically-precise propositions each 
such that it’s indefi nite whether or not he meant it in uttering 
that sentence.
(C) For some metaphysically-vague proposition p, Tom meant p in 
uttering ‘A boy was here a little while ago’.
(D) There is no metaphysically-vague proposition that Tom defi -
nitely meant in uttering ‘A boy was here a little while ago’, but 
there are myriad metaphysically-vague propositions each such 
that it’s indefi nite whether or not he meant it in uttering that 
sentence.
The big question now is whether any of (A)-(D) can survive scrutiny.
Re (A) [For some metaphysically-precise proposition p, Tom meant p in 
uttering ‘A boy was here a little while ago’, but it’s indefi nite whether or 
not he meant p in uttering that sentence]. If it’s indefi nite whether or 
not such-and-such is the case, then it’s impossible for anyone to know 
whether or not such-and-such is the case. But how can there be any 
proposition that Tom meant in uttering ‘A boy was here a little while 
ago’ if it’s impossible for him or anyone else to know that he meant it? 
Yet (A) would be true if the epistemic theory of vagueness were true, 
for that theory expounds the thesis that “the proposition a vague sen-
tence expresses in a borderline case is true or false, and we cannot 
know which” (Williamson 1997: 921). There are issues about how we 
should understand the ignorance about borderline cases epistemicism 
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requires, and I’ll have a little to say about that presently, but even 
without resolving those issues we can know that (A) is false if we can 
know that there couldn’t have been a metaphysically-precise proposi-
tion that Tom meant in uttering ‘A boy was here a little while ago’, and 
I believe we can know that in the following way.
The vagueness of Tom’s utterance, we have noticed, was three-ways 
overdetermined: by the vagueness of his utterance of ‘boy’, the vague-
ness of his utterance of ‘here’, and the vagueness of his utterance of ‘a 
little while ago’. Consequently, if Tom meant a metaphysically-precise 
proposition in uttering ‘A boy was here a little while ago’, then it must 
also have been the case that:
(1) for some metaphysically-precise property φ, Tom expressed φ 
with the token of ‘boy’ he uttered (if we pretend that ‘male’ 
and ‘human being’ express metaphysically-precise properties 
and that there is a metaphysically-precise moment at which 
a person comes into existence, then φ might be the property 
of being a male human being whose age in milliseconds ≤ 
531,066,240,000);4
(2) for some metaphysically-precise area α—i.e. area that has 
metaphysically-precise boundaries, and thus comprises a 
metaphysically-precise number of square millimeters, and a 
metaphysically-precise location relative to Tom’s location—
Tom referred to α with ‘here’;
(3) for some metaphysically-precise period of time π, Tom referred 
to π with ‘a little while ago’, where in order for that to be so 
there must be instants of time of 0 duration t, t´, t´´, and real 
numbers n, n´, n´´, such that (i) t is the instant π began, (ii) 
t´ is the instant π ended, (iii) t´´ is the instant of time a “little 
while” before which Tom is saying the boy was in α, the meta-
physically-precise area to which Tom referred with ‘here’, (iv) 
n is the precise number of milliseconds between t and t´, (v) n′ 
is the precise number of milliseconds between t´´, the instant 
of time from which all measurements of time relevant to the 
reference of ‘a little while ago’ emanate, and t, the instant of 
time such that if the boy’s appearance in α was so much as one 
yoctosecond before t, than it was too long before t´´ to count as 
“a little while ago,” and (vi) n´´ is the precise number of mil-
liseconds between t´´ and t´, the end of π and thus the instant 
of time such that if the boy’s appearance in α was so much as 
one yoctosecond after t´, then it was too soon before t´´ to count 
as a “little while ago.”
We can show that Tom didn’t mean any metaphysically-precise proposi-
4 As an expository convenience, instead of saying e.g. Tom expressed φ with 
the token of ‘boy’ he uttered I’ll say Tom expressed φ with ‘boy’, where that will be 
shorthand for the longer way of speaking. Likewise Tom referred to 𝛼 with ‘here’, for 
example, will be shorthand for Tom referred to 𝛼 with the token of ‘here’ he uttered.
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tion in uttering ‘A boy was here a little while ago’ if we can show that 
any one of (1)–(3) is false. I think we can show that each of (1)–(3) is 
false, but I’ll begin with (2) since it seems to be the simplest of the 
three requirements. There are at least the following reasons why Tom 
couldn’t have referred to a metaphysically-precise area, whether or not 
a Gricean account of speaker-reference is correct.
(i) On any plausible account of speaker-reference, acts of speaker-
reference are intentional acts in that, if for some S, o and x, S 
referred to o with x, then S uttered x with those o-directed in-
tentions that are constitutive, or at least partly constitutive, of 
her referring to o with x, and if S has the concept of speaker-
reference, then, in the normal case, she intended to refer to o 
with x. For the Gricean this is so in spades. Tom’s utterance was 
a normal case, but it ought to be obvious that there was no meta-
physically-precise area to which Tom intended to refer when he 
produced it, nor would he have thought there was any need to 
refer to such an area. We should expect a fuller description of the 
imagined scenario to include the fact that when he uttered ‘A 
boy was here a little while ago’, Tom was confi dent that he was 
saying something true because he was confi dent that a human 
male child no older than six was within four meters of him no 
more than ten minutes before he spoke. Tom gave no thought 
to which of the uncountably many metaphysically-precise areas 
containing the boy was the one he wanted to make a statement 
about, because there was no metaphysically-precise area about 
which he wanted to make a statement. Careful and considerate 
speakers try not to use a vague term unless they are confi dent 
that their use of it would be recognized as correct, but they have 
no reason to consider what would have to have been the case 
for their use of the term to have been borderline correct, or just 
barely correct or incorrect. Tom, if he understands the question 
and has his wits about him, ought to be rendered speechless by 
the question “Exactly which area did you intend to refer when 
you uttered ‘here’?” Nor did Tom think there was any need to 
refer to any particular area that contained the boy, for he would 
think he succeeded in giving the woman the information he in-
tended to give her if, as a result of his utterance, she believed 
that a boy was at a location within the vicinity of Tom which 
made his utterance true, and that didn’t require her to think 
that any particular area in which the boy was contained was the 
area to which Tom referred in producing his utterance.
(ii) It’s both a cornerstone of the Gricean account of speaker-refer-
ence and obviously true that we refer to things in order to make 
known to our hearers what we are talking about. In a normal 
case, such as Tom’s, a speaker can’t refer to a thing if she knows 
that her hearer wouldn’t be able to know to what she was refer-
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ring. Tom would know that even if there were a metaphysically-
precise location to which he wanted to refer, his hearer would 
have no way of knowing which of the uncountably many eligible 
metaphysically-precise areas was the one to which he was re-
ferring. Given that, he couldn’t have intended to refer to any 
metaphysically-precise area.
(iii) There is a deeper explanation of why Tom couldn’t have referred
to any metaphysically-precise area. The statement
There is a metaphysically-precise area α such that Tom intended to 
refer to α with ‘here’, if true, ascribes to Tom an intention that is de re 
with respect to an unspecifi ed area α, and just as one can have a belief 
that is de re with respect to a thing under one way of thinking of it but 
not under another, so one can have an intention that is de re with re-
spect to a thing under one way of thinking of it but not under another. 
Let 𝛼* be any metaphysically-precise area in the vicinity of Tom . What 
way of thinking of 𝛼* might Tom have under which it would be possible 
for him to intend to refer to 𝛼* with ‘here’? He has no perceptual way of 
thinking of 𝛼* that would do the job, and it’s very diffi cult to see what 
knowledge by description of 𝛼* he might have that would enable him 
to intend to refer to 𝛼* under it.5 It seems impossible to think of any 
kind of way of thinking of a metaphysically-precise area that would 
yield a way of thinking of 𝛼* under which Tom might have any inten-
tion or belief that was de re with respect to it. In short, it seems that 
there couldn’t have been anything about any particular metaphysical-
ly-precise area that would explain what made it, rather than any of 
the uncountably other metaphysically-precise areas that differed only 
imperceptibly from it, the area to which Tom referred with ‘here’.
I conclude that there was no metaphysically-precise area to which 
Tom referred in uttering ‘A boy was here a little while ago’, and that 
entails that there was no metaphysically-precise proposition that Tom 
meant in uttering ‘A boy was here a little while ago’. So (A) is false. 
The same sort of considerations used to show that Tom couldn’t have 
referred to a metaphysically-precise area with ‘here’ can also be used 
to show that he couldn’t have referred to a metaphysically-precise pe-
riod of time with ‘a little while ago’. In fact, given the complexity of 
what would have to be the case in order for Tom to have referred to a 
metaphysically-precise period of time (see above p. 302), it should be 
more intuitively obvious that he couldn’t have referred to a metaphys-
5 If factors that didn’t require Tom to have any intention that was de re with 
respect to 𝛼* secured it as the referent of the token of ‘here’ Tom uttered, then perhaps 
Tom could have intended to refer to α* under the description the area to which the 
token of ‘here’ I uttered refers. Yes, but (1) it’s impossible to see what factors could 
determine that reference if they didn’t include a de re intention of Tom’s about 𝛼* and 
(2) it’s just as diffi cult to see what feature one of uncountably many indiscriminable 
metaphysically-precise areas could make it alone the referent of the token of ‘here’ 
as it is to see what feature could make it alone the one to which Tom referred with 
that token of ‘here’.
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ically-precise period of time than it is that he couldn’t have referred 
to a metaphysically-precise area. So that’s another way to show that 
there couldn’t have been a metaphysically-precise proposition which 
Tom meant in uttering ‘A boy was here a little while ago’, and therefore 
another way to show that (A) is false.
Can the same sort of considerations used to show that Tom couldn’t 
have referred either to a metaphysically-precise area with ‘here’ or to 
a metaphysically-precise period of time with ‘a little while ago’ also 
be used to show that Tom couldn’t have expressed a metaphysically-
precise property with ‘boy’? I believe so, but it’s a little trickier to show 
this. We can see why it’s trickier in the following way.
Some theorists would say that the vagueness of ‘boy’ is no barrier to 
the truth or knowability of claims such as
(i) The meaning of ‘boy’ = the property of being a boy
or
(ii) ‘Boy’ is true of a person iff he is a boy
For, they would say, the vagueness of the right-hand side occurrence 
of ‘boy’ in (i) and (ii) is simply the vagueness of the word—viz. ‘boy’—
referred to on the left-hand side, so that the vagueness of the one bal-
ances out the vagueness of the other. Suppose that is right, that the 
epistemic theory of vagueness is true, and that the property of being a 
boy is metaphysically-precise, so that, in addition to (i) and (ii) being 
true, a statement like the following is also true:
(iii) The property of being a boy = the property of being a male 
human being whose age in milliseconds seconds ≤ 
531,066,240,000.
Let’s pretend that the statement like (iii) that is true is (iii) itself. Then 
(i) and (ii) would be equivalent, respectively, to
   (iv) The meaning of ‘boy’ = the property of being a male human be-
ing whose age in milliseconds ≤ 531,066,240,000
and
 (v) ‘Boy’ is true of a person iff he is a male human being whose age 
in milliseconds ≤ 531,066,240,000.
Now, according to the epistemic theorist, in order for (iii), (iv), and (v) 
to be compatible with the vagueness of ‘boy’ it would have to be impos-
sible for anyone to know any one of them, for if they could know any 
one of them then it couldn’t ever be indefi nite whether a human male 
was a boy, since it would always be in principle possible to determine 
whether or not a male human was a boy by computing the number of 
milliseconds that have passed since he was born. But the unknowabil-
ity of the truths (iii)–(v) wouldn’t render the truths (i) and (ii) unknow-
able, for just as one can know that George Eliot wrote Middlemarch 
but not know that Mary Ann Evans wrote Middlemarch, even though 
George Eliot was Mary Ann Evans, so, it might be said, one can know 
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(i) and (ii) even if it was impossible for one to know (iii), and therefore 
impossible for one to know (iv) and (v). The upshot of this would be 
that, if the epistemic theory is true, then the diffi culty in a speaker’s 
meaning a metaphysically-precise proposition in producing a vague ut-
terance arises only for vague utterances that include vague utterances 
of expressions such as ‘here’ and ‘a little while ago’, but not for vague 
utterances of terms like ‘boy’ whose meanings (we might suppose) are 
metaphysically-precise things or properties. That line of thought, then, 
is why showing that Tom couldn’t have expressed a metaphysically-
precise property with ‘boy’ is trickier than showing that he couldn’t 
have referred to a metaphysically-precise area with ‘here’ or to a meta-
physically-precise period of time with ‘a little while ago’.
In fact, however, the line of thought is specious; Tom’s utterance of 
‘boy’ really is in the same boat as his utterances of ‘here’ and ‘a little 
while ago’. If ‘boy’ did mean the property of being a boy, then it would 
be easy for Tom to intend to express the property of being a boy with 
the token of ‘boy’ he uttered. But ‘boy’ can’t mean the property of being 
a boy, and what prevents there being a metaphysically-precise property 
that Tom expressed with ‘boy’ is on all fours with what prevents him 
him from referring to a metaphysically-precise area with ‘here’ or to a 
metaphysically-precise area with ‘a little while ago’. This is due to a 
feature of every vague expression which precludes any kind of thing 
or property from being the meaning of any vague expression, a feature 
which shows that none of (i)–(v) is compatible with the vagueness of 
‘boy’, even if the epistemic theory is true. That feature is one I call pen-
umbral shift.6 Penumbral shift doesn’t per se show that speakers don’t 
mean metaphysically-precise propositions in acts of vague speaker-
meaning, but it does show that Tom’s utterance of ‘boy’ makes it no less 
diffi cult for him to have meant a metaphysically-precise proposition in 
uttering ‘A boy was here a little while ago’ than does his utterance of 
‘here’ or of ‘a little while ago’.
Penumbral shift is a feature of every vague expression, but to econo-
mize on words I will explain it only with respect to vague predicates 
like ‘boy’, ‘violinist’, ‘mathematician’, ‘communist’, and ‘triangular’ 
which, unlike such vague predicates as ‘local’, ‘ready’, ’tall’ or ‘intelli-
gent’, are apt to be regarded as having constant characters if vagueness 
is being ignored. I’ll refer to such vague predicates as predicates*. Now, 
every token of a predicate* has a penumbral profi le, and two tokens 
of a predicate* have the same penumbral profi le just in case if either 
token is true/false of a thing, then likewise for the other; if either token 
is such that it’s indefi nite whether or not it’s true/false of a thing, then 
likewise for the other; if either token is such that it’s indefi nite whether 
or not it’s indefi nite whether or not it’s true/false of a thing, then like-
wise for the other; and so on. Then we may say that penumbral shift 
(when restricted to predicates*) is the fact that the penumbral profi les 
6 Schiffer (2010) and (2016).
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of tokens of a predicate* may shift somewhat from one token of the predi-
cate* to another; that is to say, two tokens of a predicate* may have 
somewhat different penumbral profi les. The “somewhat” qualifi cation 
is important. For example, if Clyde is a man whose scalp is as hairless 
as a billiard ball and on whose scalp no hair can grow, then every token 
of ‘bald man’ must be true of Clyde, but if Clyde is blessed with a head 
of hair like the one Tom Cruise appears to have, then every token 
of ‘bald man’ must be false of him. At the same time, penumbral shift 
makes it possible for there to be three tokens of any predicate*, one of 
which is true of the thing to which it’s applied, another of which is false 
of the thing to which it’s applied, and still another of which is such that 
it’s indefi nite whether or not it’s true of the thing to which it’s applied. 
Here are three examples:
— At a party George is asked whether Henrietta came to the party 
with anyone, and he replies, gesturing at a certain man, ’She came 
with that bald guy’. That utterance would most likely be accept-
ed in the context in which it occurred as true, even if it somehow 
transpires that the man in question shaves his scalp but wouldn’t 
be said to be bald if he let his hair grow out. In another conversa-
tion, however, in which the discussion is about hereditary baldness, 
someone might correct a remark about the same man by saying, 
‘No; he’s not bald; he just shaves his scalp’, and that utterance, in 
that context, would very likely count as true. In still another context 
the question is raised whether a man who shaved his scalp would 
be bald if no one would take him to be bald if he stopped shaving his 
scalp and let his hair grow out, and in that context it might be true 
to say, ‘That’s undetermined by the use of “bald” in everyday speech; 
such a man would be neither defi nitely bald nor defi nitely not bald’.
— In a community in which people typically marry before the age 
of twenty, an utterance of ‘He’s a bachelor’ may count as true when 
said of an unmarried eighteen-year-old male, whereas in a conver-
sation among New Yorkers, where for both men and women the av-
erage age for a fi rst marriage is between thirty and thirty-fi ve, an 
utterance of ‘He’s a bachelor’ would most likely not count as defi -
nitely true when said of an unmarried eighteen-year-old male, and 
may even count as false.
— An utterance of ‘Mary is getting married to a boy from Boston’ 
would count as false if the male whom she is about to marry is fi fty-
two years old, but is apt not to count as false if he is twenty-seven 
years old. At the same time, if every one of the seven male profes-
sors in one’s department is over forty except Henry, who is twenty-
seven, an utterance of ‘Six men and one boy are professors in my 
department’ would count as a misuse of ‘boy’. The boys’ clothing 
section in a department store isn’t where a normal-size eighteen-
year-old American male would go to buy clothes, but if Jack is an 
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eighteen-year-old high school student who is the star of his school’s 
boys basketball team, an utterance of ‘Jack is the tallest boy on the 
team’ would count as true if he is the tallest person on the team.
Now we can see why, owing to the vagueness of ‘boy’, penumbral shift 
makes it impossible for any of (i)–(v) to be true. It precludes
(i) The meaning of (the predicate-type) ‘boy’ = the property of be-
ing a boy
from being true because:
1) Necessarily, the just-displayed token of (i) is true only if, 
for some property φ, φ is the referent of the token of ‘the 
property of being a boy’ in that token of (i), and the predi-
cate-type ‘boy’ means φ.
2) Necessarily, if a property φ is the meaning of a predicate-
type F, then F has a constant character and φ is the con-
tent of every token of F.
3) Necessarily, if a property φ is the content of every token 
of a predicate F, then there aren’t simultaneously two 
tokens of F one of which is true of a thing, the other of 
which isn’t true of that thing.
4) If a predicate F is subject to penumbral shift, then there 
can be two simultaneous tokens of F one of which is true 
of a thing, the other of which isn’t true of that thing.
5) ‘Boy’, being vague, is subject to penumbral shift.
6) So, no token of (i) can be true.
A similar argument shows that penumbral shift also precludes any to-
ken of
(ii) ‘Boy’ is true of a person iff he is a boy
from being true. From here it should be easy to see that each of
(iii) The property of being a boy = the property of being a male hu-
man being whose age in milliseconds ≤ 531,066,240,000.
(iv) The meaning of ‘boy’ = the property of being a male human be-
ing whose age in milliseconds ≤ 531,066,240,000.
(v) ‘Boy’ is true of a person iff he is a male human being whose age 
in milliseconds ≤ 531,066,240,000.
is also incompatible with the fact that ‘boy’, being vague, is subject to 
penumbral shift. None of this shows that penumbral shift is per se in-
compatible with the epistemic theory of vagueness. It only shows that 
penumbral shift is incompatible with a version of the epistemic theory 
which holds that some property is the meaning of ‘boy’. The upshot of 
all this as regards the hypothesis that Tom meant a metaphysically-
precise proposition is that, whether or not t he epistemic theory is true, 
the problem that his utterance of ‘here’ or ‘a little while ago’ makes for 
the proposal that Tom meant a metaphysically-precise proposition in 
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uttering ‘A boy was here a little while ago’ is equally made by his utter-
ance of ‘boy’. For if Tom meant a metaphysically-proposition, then there 
was a metaphysically-precise property that Tom expressed with ‘boy’, 
and now that we see that that property can’t be the meaning of ‘boy’, it 
will be just as diffi cult to see how just one of the nearly identical meta-
physically-precise properties in contention—e.g. the property of being a 
human male whose age in milliseconds ≤ 531,066,240, 000, as opposed, 
say, to the property of being a human male whose age in milliseconds ≤ 
531,066,239,000.07 or the property of being a human male whose age 
in milliseconds ≤ 531,066,240,000.8— could be determined to be the 
metaphysically-precise property expressed by Tom’s uttered token of 
‘boy’ as it was to see how just one of the metaphysically-precise areas in 
contention could be determined to be the metaphysically-precise area 
to which he referred with the token of ‘here’ he uttered.
I conclude that we know that there was no metaphysically-precise 
proposition that Tom meant in uttering ‘A boy was here a little while 
ago’, and therefore know that (A) is false.
Re (B) [There is no metaphysically-precise proposition that Tom defi -
nitely meant in uttering ‘A boy was here a little while ago’, but there are 
myriad metaphysically-precise propositions each such that it’s indefi nite 
whether or not he meant it in uttering that sentence]. We know from the 
discussion of (A) that there was no metaphysically-precise proposition 
that Tom meant in uttering ‘A boy was here a little while ago’, and if we 
know that, then it’s defi nitely the case. Therefore, it’s not the case that 
there are myriad metaphysically-precise propositions each such that 
it’s indefi nite whether or not Tom meant it in uttering ‘A boy was here a 
little while ago’, for the considerations adduced to show that (A) is false 
also show that every metaphysically-precise proposition is such that 
Tom defi nitely did not mean it. Therefore, (B), as well as (A), is false.
Re (C) [For some metaphysically-vague proposition p, Tom meant p in 
uttering ‘A boy was here a little while ago’]. This answer presupposes 
vagueness-in-the-world; according to it Tom’s utterance was vague 
because he meant a metaphysically-vague proposition in producing 
it. Many philosophers will doubt (C) because they doubt whether the 
notion of metaphysical vagueness can be made coherent. Here is how 
David Lewis expressed his own frustration with the idea that there are 
metaphysically vague things:
I doubt that I have any correct conception of a vague object. How, for in-
stance, shall I think of an object that is vague in its spatial extent? The 
closest I can come is to superimpose three pictures. There is the multiplicity 
picture, in which the vague object gives way to its many precisifi cations, 
and the vagueness of the object gives way to differences between precisifi ca-
tions. There is the ignorance picture, in which the object has some defi nite 
but secret extent. And there is the fadeaway picture, in which the presence 
of the object admits of degree, in much the way that the presence of a spot 
of illumination admits of degree, and the degree diminishes as a function 
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of the distance from the region where the object is most intensely present. 
None of the three pictures is right. Each one in its own way replaces the al-
leged vagueness of the object by precision. But if I cannot think of a vague 
object except by juggling these mistaken pictures, I have no correct concep-
tion. (Lewis 1999a: 170)
That objection to v agueness-in-the-world is certainly discussable, but 
in order to give the propositional account of speaker-meaning its best 
run for the money, I will for present purposes assume that vagueness-
in-the-world is at least coherent. My question, then, concerns the plau-
sibility of (C) on the assumption that there are metaphysically-vague 
properties, areas, periods of time, and propositions. The answer to my 
question, I submit, is that (C) isn’t plausible even on that assumption: 
it’s shown to be false by exactly the same sort of considerations that 
showed (A) to be false.
The hypothesis that Tom meant a metaphysically-precise propo-
sition in uttering ‘A boy was here a little while ago’ entails that he 
expressed a metaphysically-precise property with ‘boy’, referred to a 
metaphysically-precise area with ‘here’, and referred to a metaphys-
ically-precise period of time with ‘a little while ago’. The hypothesis 
that Tom meant a metaphysically-vague proposition in producing his 
utterance entails only that he expressed a metaphysically-vague prop-
erty with ‘boy’, referred to a metaphysically-vague area with ‘here’, or 
referred to a metaphysically-vague period of time with ‘a little while 
ago’. For example, it’s compatible with Tom’s having a meant a meta-
physically-vague proposition that he expressed a metaphysically-vague 
property with ‘boy’ but referred to a metaphysically-precise area with 
‘here’ and to a metaphysically-precise period of time with ‘a little while 
ago’. At the same time, as we have seen, we can’t account for the vague-
ness of Tom’s utterances of ‘here’ and ‘a little while ago’ if he referred 
to metaphysically-precise things with those expressions, so in fact the 
only way he could have meant a metaphysically-vague proposition that 
was compatible with the vagueness of his utterances of ‘boy’, ‘here’, 
and ‘a little while ago’ is if he expressed a metaphysically-vague prop-
erty with ‘boy’, referred to a metaphysically-vague area with ‘here’ and 
to a metaphysically-vague period of time with ‘a little while ago’. The 
upshot as regards (C) is that we can see that it’s false by seeing that 
Tom couldn’t have referred to any metaphysically-vague area for the 
same reason, mutatis mutandis, that he couldn’t have referred to any 
metaphysically-precise area. The fundamental reason Tom couldn’t re-
fer to any metaphysically-precise area is that he had no way of think-
ing about any such area under which he might intend to refer to it, 
and this because each such area was for him indistinguishable from 
the uncountably many precise areas that differed from it only in some 
imperceptible way. The same is also true of the uncountably many 
metaphysically-vague areas in Tom’s vicinity (if there are such things). 
For example, there will be two such areas 𝛼1 and 𝛼2 such that if any 
location is defi nitely in 𝛼1, then it’s also defi nitely in 𝛼2, and vice versa, 
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the only difference between the areas being that there are locations 
such that while it’s indefi nite whether or not they are in 𝛼1, it’s merely 
indefi nite whether or not it’s indefi nite whether or not they are in 𝛼2, 
and that’s not a difference that would enable Tom to intend to refer to 
either area, for he would still have neither a perceptual nor descrip-
tive way of thinking of either area under which he could have any de 
re propositional attitudes about it. If there are metaphysically-vague 
things or properties, they are every bit as fi nely individuated as any 
metaphysically-precise thing or property.
Re (D) [There is no metaphysically-vague proposition that Tom defi -
nitely meant in uttering ‘A boy was here a little while ago’, but there are 
myriad metaphysically-vague propositions each such that it’s indefi nite 
whether or not he meant it in uttering that sentence]. (D) stands to (C) 
as (B) stands to (A). We know from the discussion of (C) that there was 
no metaphysically-vague proposition that Tom meant in uttering ‘A 
boy was here a little while ago’, and if we know that, then it’s defi nitely 
the case. Therefore, it’s not the case that there are myriad metaphys-
ically-vague propositions each such that it’s indefi nite whether or not 
Tom meant it in uttering ‘A boy was here a little while ago’, for the con-
siderations adduced to show that (C) is false also show that, if there are 
metaphysically-vague propositions, then every metaphysically-vague 
proposition is such that Tom defi nitely did not mean it. Therefore, (D), 
as well as (C), is false.
3. The Cost of Vague Speaker-Meaning 
for Gricean Semantics
So, I submit, none of (A)–(D) survives scrutiny, and from this we may 
conclude that there was no proposition that Tom meant in uttering ‘A 
boy was here a little while ago’. Tom’s utterance is an arbitrary ex-
ample of vague speaker-meaning, and since virtually every utterance 
is vague, virtually every utterance is an instance of vague speaker-
meaning. If there is no proposition that Tom meant in producing his 
utterance, then speakers virtually never mean propositions when they 
speak. Let’s explore the consequences of this for Gricean semantics 
under three headings: speaker-meaning, propositional attitudes, and 
meta-semantics & semantics.
Speaker-meaning (and propositional speech acts generally)
The Gricean, as well as the dominant, conception of speaker-meaning 
is as a relation between speakers and the propositions they mean. This 
conception collapses in the face of vague speaker-meaning, if what I’ve 
argued in the preceding section is correct. This of course doesn’t mean 
that an utterance such as
In uttering ‘Phil and Barbara have three kids’, Sid meant that Phil 
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and Barbara have three young goats
can’t be true, but it does mean that if it’s true then its ‘that’-clause 
doesn’t refer to any proposition. This raises two questions: First, might 
the Gricean program, or at least some version of it, make do with some-
thing other than propositions to be the things we mean, say, and tell 
people? Second, should any other erst-while propositionalist seek some-
thing other than propositions to be the things we mean? I believe the 
answer to both questions is no. If there are such things as the things we 
mean, then those things must be capable of having truth-values, and 
if those things aren’t propositions, then they must either be mental-
ese sentences or, more likely, public language sentences or utterances 
(think of Donald Davidson’s “paratactic” theory of saying-that). The 
mentalese version of sententialism has a host of problems that keep 
it from being a serious option for anyone,7 and the public-language ver-
sion is unacceptable to the Gricean because it requires a non-Gricean 
account of the semantic properties of expressions.8 But there is another 
reason why there aren’t things of any kind that can be the things we 
mean if, for the reasons I’ve given, propositions can’t be the things we 
mean—viz. there would have been nothing to prevent there having 
been a proposition that Tom meant in uttering ‘A boy was here a little 
while ago’ if there had been a metaphysically-precise vague property, 
area and period of time to which he referred with, respectively, the to-
kens he uttered of ‘boy’, ‘here’, and ‘a little while ago’, but, as I pointed 
out in fn. 6, it’s just as diffi cult to see, for example, what feature one of 
uncountably many indiscriminable metaphysically-precise or vague ar-
eas could make it alone the referent of the token of ‘here’ as it is to see 
what feature could make it alone the one to which Tom referred with 
that token of ‘here’. I conclude that, while there are true reports like 
the one displayed just above, neither speaker-meaning nor any other 
other “propositional” speech act is a relation to anything. I’ll presently 
say something about the challenge this conclusion poses.
Propositional attitudes
The dominant view of propositional attitudes, as well as the view of 
them Gricean semantics requires, is that they are…well, propositional 
attitudes. The dominant view of believing, for example, is that it’s a 
relation between a believer and a proposition she believes. But if the 
considerations adduced to show that there is no proposition that Tom 
meant in producing his utterance really do show that, then they also 
show that vague propositional attitudes aren’t relations to proposi-
tions. This is an important point. Other philosophers have made their 
own trouble for the view that communication involves a speaker’s ut-
tering words that encode the proposition she wants to communicate, 
7 See Schiffer (1987: Chapter 4 “Intentionality and the Language of Thought”).
8 See op. cit., Chapter 5 “Sententialist Theories of Belief.”
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and that her attempted communication is successful just in case her 
hearer successfully decodes the encoded proposition. But the philoso-
phers who have argued against this view of communication have held 
that, while successful communication doesn’t consist in a hearer’s en-
tertaining or believing the very same proposition that is the content of 
the belief the speaker expressed in producing her utterance—i.e. the 
belief that was the proximal cause of her utterance—it does consist 
in a certain similarity-relation’s obtaining between the proposition the 
speaker believed and the one the hearer entertained or believed as a 
result of the speaker’s utterance. That was the view to which Frege was 
giving voice when he wrote:
In the case of an actual proper name such as ‘Aristotle’ opinions as to the 
sense may differ. It might, for instance, be taken to be the following: the pu-
pil of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great. Anybody who does this will 
attach another sense to the sentence ‘Aristotle was born in Stagira’ than 
will a man who takes as the sense of the name: the teacher of Alexander the 
Great who was born in Stagira. So long as the reference remains the same, 
such variations of sense may be tolerated, although they are to be avoided in 
the theoretical structure of a demonstrative science and ought not to occur 
in a perfect language.9
But if what I have been arguing is on the right track, not only was 
there no proposition that Tom meant in uttering ‘A boy was here a little 
while ago’, there were also no propositions that were the contents of the 
beliefs and intentions that lead him to utter that sentence. This should 
be clear, for if what I said about Tom’s utterance of e.g. ‘here’ was cor-
rect, the reason he couldn’t refer either to a metaphysically-precise or 
to a metaphysically-vague area with ‘here’ is that there was nothing 
about any area of either kind that could explain how Tom could have 
an intention or belief that was de re with respect it. At the same time, 
to redirect to propositional-attitude reports a point already made about 
speech-act reports, it remains true that what lead to his utterance was 
his knowing that a boy had been in his vicinity a little while before he 
spoke, and that he said what he did to the woman to whom he spoke 
because he wanted to share that knowledge with her. It’s just that 
although the propositional-attitude report I just made in writing the 
preceding sentence is true, neither its ‘that’-clause nor the occurrence 
of ‘that knowledge’ in it refers to a proposition.
9 Frege (1892). For contemporary expressions of the view see for example 
McDowell (1984a), Heck (2002), Buchanan and Ostertag (2005), and Buchanan 
(2010). NYU Ph.D. student Martin Abreu defends a novel version of this line in his 
nearly completed doctoral dissertation.
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Meta-semantics & semantics
How do the conclusions so far reached affect what the Gricean needs 
to say about the nature and determinants of the semantic properties 
of linguistic expressions? To answer this I’ll begin by sketching what 
the Gricean needs to say about those things. My sketch will impose a 
certain degree of regimentation, and there are ways my sketch may be 
varied while remaining faithful to the Gricean program, but I believe 
that the sketch I’m about to give captures what must be regarded as 
essential to the program.
A language, as David Lewis liked to emphasize (Lewis 1969, 1975), 
is a certain kind of abstract object that may or may not be used by 
anyone—to wit, a fi nitely statable function that maps each of infi nitely 
many sequences of sounds, or marks, or hand gestures, or whatever 
(the expressions of the language) to things that do the job that “mean-
ings” are supposed to do. If a function L is a language and L(ε) = μ, 
then we may stipulate that ε is an “expression” of L and μ its “mean-
ing” in L. What sort of thing a meaning must be is determined by the 
work a language must do in order for it to be the language of a given 
population. To say what that way is is to defi ne a relation R such that, 
necessarily, if a language L bears R to a population P, then L is the lan-
guage of P, where that is equivalent to saying that every expression of 
L means in P what it means in L, and where the notion of meaning-in-
a-population is the use-dependent notion of meaning that philosophers 
have long struggled to understand. Let’s call that relation, whatever it 
turns out to be, the public-language relation. The Gricean, we know, 
aims to defi ne the public-language relation in terms of his defi ned no-
tion of speaker-meaning, together with certain ancillary notions, such 
as that of a conventional practice, which are themselves defi nable in 
terms of ordinary beliefs and intentions and without recourse to any 
public-language semantic notions. So, if we know the Gricean’s account 
of the public-language relation, then we will know exactly how a lan-
guage must be used by a population in order for it to be the population’s 
public language, the language members of the population use to com-
municate with one another, and in knowing that we will know what 
role something must play if it’s to be the meaning an expression has 
for the members of that population. The following gives the gist of a 
Gricean account of the public-language relation:
L is a language of P iff there prevails in P a system of conventional 
practices conformity to which requires one who produces an unem-
bedded utterance of a sentence of L to mean thereby a proposition 
that (in a sense presently to be explained) “fi ts” the meaning of the 
sentence in L .10
10 An unembedded utterance of a sentence is an utterance of it that doesn’t occur 
as part of the utterance of another sentence.
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This explains how for the Gricean uttering a sentence with a certain 
meaning can be extremely good evidence that in uttering the sentence 
the speaker meant a proposition that fi ts the sentence’s meaning.
When we understand the “fi tting” relation we will know what the 
Gricean takes expression-meanings to be. To understand that rela-
tion we must understand the meaning/content distinction. Meanings 
are properties of expression-types, contents of expression-tokens. The 
meaning of an expression-type is, in effect, a rule or formula that speci-
fi es the conditions that something must satisfy if it’s to be the content 
of a token of the expression. Then we can say that the proposition a 
speaker means in uttering a sentence is the content of the token of the 
sentence the speaker uttered just in case the proposition satisfi es the 
rule or formula that the sentence means. (Specifi cations of these mean-
ings are statable in “character”-style as functions from tokens onto 
their contents.) Propositions are the contents of sentence tokens, and a 
primary role such a content plays is to be the proposition the speaker 
means when he utters an unembedded sentence token whose content is 
that proposition. The content of every expression token will be what it 
contributes to the content of the unembedded sentence token in which 
the expression token occurs. If a Gricean is ignoring vagueness, then to 
a rough approximation he might say that:
— The content of every token of ‘boy’ (that has a content) is the 
property of being a boy.
— The content of a token of ‘here’ is an area 𝛼 such that the speaker 
who uttered the token is within 𝛼 and she referred to 𝛼 with the 
token of ‘here’ she uttered.11
— The content of a token of ‘a little while ago’ is a period of time π 
such that π occurred shortly before the token was uttered and the 
speaker who uttered the token referred to π with it.
— The content of a token of ‘A boy was here a little while’ is the 
proposition that something that had φ was in 𝛼 at a time within π, 
where φ is the content of the uttered token of ‘boy’, 𝛼 the content of 
the uttered token of ‘here’, and π the content of the uttered token of 
‘a little while ago’.
What remains of this Gricean semantic and meta-semantic picture 
when one tries to adjust it to accommodate vagueness? The answer, 
if what I’ve argued is correct, should be clear: absolutely nothing. A 
language won’t be “a pairing of sound and meaning over an infi nite 
domain” (Chomsky 1980: 82), for there won’t be anything that can be 
the co ntent of a token of a vague expression, and therefore nothing to 
be the meaning of a vague expression. At the same time, the Gricean 
doesn’t stand alone, for, as I’ve already implied (see above p. 312), the 
11 This ignores the use of ‘here’ manifested when the FBI agent points to a 
certain spot on a map and says to the guy who’s about to enter the witness protection 
program, ‘Here is where you’ll live for the foreseeable future’.
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considerations that frustrate his attempt to assign denotations to the 
tokens of the vague expressions that occur in a token of the sentence ‘A 
boy was here a little while ago’ will frustrate the attempt of any other 
theorist to do the same.12
You might feel that I’ve painted myself into a corner I can’t get out 
of. I’ve committed myself to the following two claims about Tom’s utter-
ance of ‘A boy was here a little while ago’. First, that the utterance was 
true, and second, that it’s truth-value wasn’t a function of the denota-
tions of its constituent expressions. But how can the utterance be true 
unless it has truth conditions, and how can it have truth conditions 
if they’re not a function of the denotations the sentence’s constituent 
expressions have in the utterance. Well, ther e is a sense in which the 
utterance has truth conditions and a sense in which those conditions, 
such as they are, are determined by denotation-like properties of the 
utterances of the sentence’s constituent expressions. The utterance of 
the sentence has truth conditions in the sense that there are myriad 
states of affairs which, if realized, would make the utterance determi-
nately true, and myriad states of affairs which, if realized, would make 
the utterance determinately false. An example of the fi rst sort would 
be a state of affairs in which a fi ve-year-old human male was within 
three meters of Tom eight minutes before he spoke, and an example of 
the second sort of state of affairs would be one in which a ninety-year-
old woman was the only person to be within a kilometer of Tom in the 
two hours before he spoke. Moreover, that those states of affairs have 
that status is clearly due to there being conditions whose satisfaction 
by a use of ‘boy’, or ‘here’, or ‘a little while ago’ would make Tom’s use 
of it determinately correct, likewise for conditions that would make 
the use of any one of those vague expressions determinately incorrect. 
What there can’t be is a set of states of affairs such that the utter-
ance was determinately true just in case some member of the set was 
realized, another set such that the utterance was determinately false 
just in case some member of that set was realized, or a set of states 
of affairs such that an utterance of the sentence would be such that 
it would be indeterminate whether or not it’s true just in case some 
member that set was realized. And so on. Likewise, mutatis mutandis, 
for there not being for any vague expression a set of conditions such 
that an utterance of the expression would be determinately correct just 
in case some member of the set was satisfi ed. And so on. Nevertheless, 
my conclusions do seem to preclude a natural language from having a 
correct compositional meaning theory or a correct compositional truth 
theory, where a compositional meaning theory is taken to be a fi nitely 
statable theory that issues for each of the infi nitely many expressions 
of the language a theorem that assigns to it its meaning in the lan-
guage, and where a compositional truth theory for a language is taken 
12 I take this claim to be more or less obvious, but if it isn’t (and even if it is) I 
can’t take the space here to give the claim the elaboration it may deserve.
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to be a fi nitely statable theory of the language that issues for each of 
the infi nitely many sentences of the language a theorem that specifi es 
the conditions under which an utterance of the sentence would be true 
and the conditions under which it would be false. So it’s far from clear 
what kind of systematic, but evidently non-compositional, account of 
whatever sort of semantic properties expressions have if what I’ve said 
about the effect of vagueness on semantics is correct. So, until what 
needs to be explained—whatever exactly that is reckoned to be—is sat-
isfactorily explained, perhaps the most that can be said for what this 
essay accomplishes is that it has displayed a new paradox about vague-
ness and meaning. I’ll take that.
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